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 1 Introduction
One of the central questions in the ﬁeld of economics of uncertainty is the
inﬂuence of attitudes toward risk (i.e., the eﬀect of risk aversion) on opti-
mal decisions. Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) ﬁrst looked at this question
in the early 1960s, in the context of a portfolio problem. Since then, the
analysis of the behavior of risk-averse individuals facing risk has been set in
the context of Arrow-Pratt theory, most notably in the ﬁelds of insurance
and ﬁnance. The analysis has also been extended by Kihlstrom and Mirman
(1974) (henceforth, KM) to multidimensional utility functions in situations
in which the goods are not perfect substitutes (e.g., a dynamic environment).
In particular, KM show that to generalize the Arrow-Pratt approach to the
multidimensional case, the issue of separating tastes from attitudes toward
risk must be dealt with. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of risk aversion on behavior
in the multidimensional case must take account of the problem of disentan-
gling tastes and attitudes toward risk. To achieve this, KM consider utility
functions that diﬀer by a concave transformation, and, thus, preserve ordi-
nal preferences over gambles. There is also another approach suggested by
Selden (1978), which has been widely popularized in the ﬁeld of macroeco-
nomics through the parametric model of Epstein and Zin (1989) (henceforth,
the Selden-EZ approach).1 The basis for this approach is the certainty equiv-
alence of the one-dimensional Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion.
In this paper, we show that the Selden-EZ approach yields choices over
gambles that are inconsistent with ordinal preferences. This is due to the
fact that the ordinal preferences are distorted by the Selden-EZ approach.
In contrast, the KM approach using concave transformations of the utility
function alters the expected marginal rate of substitution in a way that is
consistent with ordinal preferences. This is a subtle point because Selden-
EZ preferences do represent the same deterministic preferences. However,
it does not follow that preferences over gambles remain the same. To show
this, we consider the case of two identical gambles (in terms of utility out-
comes). Under the KM approach, an individual is indiﬀerent between the
1See also Kreps and Porteus (1978).
3two identical utility gambles. However, this is not the case under the Selden-
EZ approach. In particular, for some values of the certainty equivalent, an
individual chooses the gamble for which the distribution of the values of the
risky good ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates. In other words, the eﬀect of
risk aversion cannot be isolated since the choice for the particular gamble is
unrelated to the issue of riskiness. We then consider the case of two distinct
gambles, with one worse than the other (in terms of utility gambles). We
show that the Selden-EZ approach leads to a reversal of preference ordering
for some values of the certainty equivalent, i.e., the worst gamble can be
chosen. This is never the case under the KM approach.
We then proceed to study the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal decisions
using the KM approach. Speciﬁcally, we consider a general consumer’s max-
imization problem under uncertainty subject to a budget constraint. In the
stochastic environment, there is a sure good and a risky good. The good
is risky due to the presence of randomness in the budget constraint. The
sure good is chosen before the realization of the random variable is observed.
The risky good is a residual, i.e., the risky good depends on the outcome of
the random parameter through the budget constraint. The set up is thus a
generalization of Arrow-Pratt’s portfolio model in which the goods are per-
fect substitutes. We consider three cases of randomness: random income,
random price of the sure good, and random price of the risky good.2 In each
case, we study the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal decisions.
We show that in the random income case as well as the case of the random
price of the sure good, the eﬀect of risk aversion is to decrease the amount of
the sure normal good. While if the price of the risky good is random, then the
eﬀect of risk aversion on the amount of the sure good is ambiguous. These
results follow from the fact that a more risk-averse individual is not concerned
by the riskiness of the risky good, but rather by the riskiness of the utility
gamble associated with the consumption bundle of the sure and risky goods.
This is merely an implication of the expected utility maximization problem
2Note that the majority of the literature on risk aversion has been set in the context
of the static portfolio problem, which is equivalent to the price of the risky good being
random.
4faced by the consumer. In fact, when the holding of the risky good increases,
it decreases the riskiness of the utility gamble faced by the individual. In
other words, a concave transformation of the utility function implies that
the more risk-averse individual prefers gambles whose corresponding utility
gambles are less risky. This result pinpoints the rationale of the consumer’s
decisions not as choice on the amount of risky versus sure goods, but rather
as a choice on a set of utility gambles ordered in terms of their riskiness.3
Because the riskiness of the utility gambles yield the incentive for the con-
sumer to choose an optimal gamble, through the maximization of expected
utility, this leads to the counterintuitive result, which was originally observed
by Ross (1981). Indeed, Ross (1981) provides an example showing that the
Arrow-Pratt deﬁnition of risk aversion fails to deliver the right “intuitive”
results. In particular, Ross (1981) writes that “in the portfolio problem, as
wealth rises individuals whose risk aversion declines in the Arrow-Pratt sense
do not necessarily increase their holding of riskier assets.” Convinced of the
intuitive idea that more risk aversion implies a smaller amount of the riskier
asset (or good), Ross (1981) introduces a stronger measure of risk aversion
that is necessary to accommodate the phenomenon observed when there are
several independent sources of risk, i.e., that the more risk averse individual
actually chooses to consume more of the risky asset. In fact, in the example
provided by Ross (1981), the individual chooses more of the risky asset (or
good) because it reduces the riskiness of the utility gamble.
In our general approach to the consumer problem, we relate classical
demand theory to the theory of risk aversion. In particular, we show that the
inﬂuence of risk aversion can be separated into independent components, i.e.,
income eﬀect and substitution eﬀect, as in classical demand theory with the
outcome depending on their interplay. The interaction between the income
and substitution eﬀects as a determinant of the eﬀect of risk aversion on
optimal choice has also been noted in KM in the context of a consumer-saving
problem. KM show that the eﬀect of changing risk aversion depends on on
3See Bommier et al. (2011) who extends the insight in Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) by
pointing out a direct relationship between increasing risk aversion and preferences ordering
over gambles, i.e., a more risk-averse individual prefers less risky utility gambles.
5the eﬀect of the rate of return on savings in the classical (certainty) case, that
is, the impact of the interplay between the income and substitution eﬀects.
We generalize the KM result by showing that in a two-dimensional setting
the eﬀect of changing risk aversion depends on the source of randomness
as well as the inﬂuence of ordinal eﬀects, i.e., the income and substitution
eﬀects.
Our results on the eﬀect of risk aversion are summarized in three Proposi-
tions, which are inserted between relevant examples and ﬁgures that illustrate
the Propositions. Proposition 3.1 studies the case in which income is ran-
dom. Here, the direction of the eﬀect of risk aversion depends on the income
eﬀect for the sure good. When the sure good is normal, the optimal decision
of a more risk-averse individual is always to consume more of the risky good,
which decreases the riskiness of the associated utility gamble. It is precisely
this case that contradicts the Ross intuition that more risk-averse individual
prefers more of the sure (or riskless) good. In Proposition 3.4, we show that,
if the price of the sure normal good is random, a more risk-averse individual
always chooses more of the risky good, since the income and substitution
eﬀects pull in the same direction. Here, the pure substitution eﬀect provides
an incentive to consume less of the sure good. In this case, the utility gam-
bles become less risky with more of the risky good, yielding an incentive for
the consumer to move in that direction. Proposition 3.7 shows that, if the
price of the risky normal good is random, as in the traditional portfolio prob-
lem, then the choice of the normal sure good becomes ambiguous. In this
case, there is an incentive through the pure substitution eﬀect to increase the
amount of the sure good, i.e., increasing the sure good less a less risky utility
gamble. Hence, the income and substitution eﬀects pull in opposite direc-
tions, and depending on the relative strengths of these eﬀects, the individual
may be led to consume more or less of the normal good. Note that Proposi-
tion 3.7 encompasses the Arrow-Pratt’s result, namely a decreased in holding
of a risky good in the event of an increase in risk aversion, which is a special
case and is due to the fact that, in the one-dimensional case (i.e., perfect
substitutes), there is no income eﬀect, which implies that the utility gamble
becomes less risky as the amount of the sure good is increased. However,
6when there is an income eﬀect, this result holds only when the substitution
eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show that the Selden-
EZ approach cannot disentangle risk aversion from tastes, and, thus, cannot
be used to isolate the eﬀect of risk aversion. In Section 3, we use the KM
approach to study the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal decisions. Section 4
concludes.
2 Risk Aversion and Concave Transformations
To study the eﬀect of risk aversion on behavior in the multidimensional case,
tastes and attitudes toward risk must be disentangled. This issue does not
arise for the class of one-dimensional strictly increasing utility functions since
tastes are represented by the natural ordering on the real line, i.e., x>y
means that x   y. However, the relationship between the utility representa-
tion, risk aversion, and tastes is much more delicate in the multidimensional
case since there is no natural order. In other words, diﬀerent utility func-
tions incorporate diﬀerent tastes as well as diﬀerent attitudes toward risk so
that the link between risk aversion and risk averse behavior is not clearly
identiﬁed. For instance, Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) provide an example
in which the preference between a sure outcome and a gamble depend solely
on tastes and not on risk aversion. To see this, let U1(x,y)a n dU2(x,y)
be two distinct utility functions yielding indiﬀerence curves of the type IC1
and IC2, respectively, as depicted in Figure 1. Let (xA,y A)a n d( xB,y B)
be two distinct consumption bundles such that U1(xA,y A) >U 1(xB,y B)a n d
U2(xA,y A) <U 2(xB,y B). Consider choosing between the sure outcome yield-
ing (xA,y A) and a gamble yielding (xA,y A) with probability π ∈ (0,1] and
(xB,y B) with probability 1−π. Consistent with Figure 1, an individual with
preferences U1(x,y) prefers the sure outcome, while an individual with prefer-
ences U2(x,y) prefers the gamble.4 The individual with preferences U2(x,y)
acts in a seemingly more risk-averse way than the individual with preferences
4In other words, U1(xA,y A) >π U 1(xA,y A)+( 1− π)U1(xB,y B), while U2(xA,y A) <







Figure 1: KM Example
U1(x,y), but is not more risk-averse. Rather, it is the composition of goods
in the gamble that is preferred.
Two approaches have been suggested to disentangle tastes from risk aver-
sion, and, thus, to analyze the eﬀect of risk aversion on behavior. The ﬁrst
established in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) (henceforth, KM) considers the




2 > 0,u   
1,u   
2 ≤ 0, be the utility associated with the consumption proﬁle
(x,y) ∈ R2
+.5 Given (1), for any gamble g on (x, ˜ y)i nw h i c hx is the sure
5We consider two-dimensional utility functions with additive functions only for clarity.
The discussion applies to any dimension as well as more general utility functions.
8good and ˜ y is the risky good, the KM utility function is
WKM(x, ˜ y)=E˜ yvKM (u1(x)+u2(˜ y)), (2)
where E˜ y is the expectation operator with respect to ˜ y,a n dvKM is a strictly
increasing and concave function, v 
KM > 0,v  
KM ≤ 0.6
In the KM approach, a more concave vKM (and, thus, a more concave
WKM) means that the agent is more risk-averse. Hence, KM deﬁnes risk
aversion by using the concave transformation of the utility function. In
doing so, KM restricts attention to utility representations that diﬀer by a
concave transformation. Note that, with the KM approach, the measure of
risk aversion (i.e., the concavity of vKM) is independent of any gamble.
The KM approach can be used to study the eﬀect of risk aversion on
behavior because concave transformations of the utility function alter the
expected marginal rate of substitution in a way that is consistent with ordinal










B),(1 − π) ◦ (xB,yB)

, (4)
where, for i = A,B, y
i < yi and π ∈ [0,1] is the probability of receiving
(xi,y
i) in gamble i. We make two further restrictions. First, the gambles are
not on the same vertical lines, i.e., xA <x B. Second, y
A >y
B and yA > yB,
i.e., ˜ yA ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates ˜ yB.






Proposition 2.1 states that a KM concave transformation does not alter the
ordering of these two gambles. Indeed, from (3), (4), (5), and (6), the KM









Figure 2: Case 1












+( 1− π)vKM (u1(xB)+u2(yB)). (7)
Formally,
Proposition 2.1. Suppose (5) and (6) hold. Under KM preferences, for any
concave transformation vKM, an individual is indiﬀerent between gamble A
and gamble B.














Figure 3: Case 2
That is, in terms of utility levels, gamble A is strictly worse than gamble B.
Proposition 2.2 states that, regardless of the concave transformation vKM,
gamble B is always strictly preferred to gamble A. Indeed, for π ∈ [0,1),
WKM(xA, ˜ yA) <W KM(xB, ˜ yB).7 Formally,
Proposition 2.2. Suppose (8) and (9) hold, and π ∈ [0,1).U n d e r K M
preferences, for any concave transformation vKM, gB   gA.
The second approach suggested by Selden (1978), which has been widely
popularized in the ﬁeld of macroeconomics through the parametric model
of Epstein and Zin (1989) (henceforth, the Selden-EZ approach) uses the












+( 1− π)vKM (u1(xB)+u2(yB)). (10)
11certainty equivalent as a measure of risk aversion. Formally, given (1), for
any gamble g on (x, ˜ y), the Selden-EZ utility function is




S (E˜ yvS(˜ y)) (12)
is the certainty equivalent. Here, E˜ y is the expectation operator with respect
to ˜ y and vS is a strictly increasing and concave function, v 
S > 0,v  
S ≤ 0.
In the Selden-EZ approach, a decrease in μ(˜ y,vS) due to a more concave
vS is used to mean that the agent is more risk averse. The basis for this
approach is the certainty equivalence of the one dimensional Arrow-Pratt
theory of risk-aversion. However, while there is an equivalence between a
positive risk premium (or a certainty equivalent) and a concave transforma-
tion of the utility function in the one-dimensional case, this is not true in the
multidimensional case.
In fact, unlike KM preferences, Selden-EZ preferences distort the expected
marginal rate of substitution in a way that yields choices that are inconsistent
with ordinal preferences. Selden-EZ preferences do not fall into the same
category as the KM preferences because Selden-EZ preferences do not follow
from a concave transformation. Indeed, a change in the concavity of vS is
equivalent to a concave transformation on the second utility function u2.
This partial concave transformation in Selden-EZ preferences is the reason
that the Selden-EZ utility representation conﬂates tastes with risk aversion.
Moreover, unlike the KM measure of risk aversion, the Selden-EZ measure
of risk aversion can only be studied when there is a speciﬁc gamble. Indeed,
without a gamble, preferences revert to the original deterministic preferences,
so that vS is only relevant with respect to a speciﬁc gamble.
The problems with the choice of gambles in the Selden-EZ approach is
subtler than in the KM example of Figure 1. The KM example does not
apply to Selden-EZ preferences because Selden-EZ preferences represent the
same deterministic preferences, i.e., the same indiﬀerence curves. However,
Selden-EZ preferences do not represent consistent preferences over gambles
12since changes in the concavity of vS also changes tastes for gambles. In order
to show this inconsistency, we need a more subtle example using the fact
that deterministic preferences are the same. In fact, we can use the gambles
deﬁned by (3) and (4) to show that an inconsistency arises. Suppose that the
ordinal preferences over the bundles are as depicted in Figure 2. In contrast
to Proposition 2.1, Proposition 2.3 states that the Selden-EZ approach alters
the ordering of these two gambles. In fact, gamble A can be preferred to
gamble B because the expected return on the risky good ˜ yA is strictly greater
than the expected return on the risky good ˜ yB. T h i si si m p o r t a n tb e c a u s e
it shows that Selden-EZ preferences disregard tastes in favor of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance on the value of outcomes in the risky good. Moreover,
the fact that Selden-EZ preferences chooses gamble A is unrelated to the
riskiness of the values of the risky good. In fact, from Figure 2, even though
gamble A is preferred, yA − y
A > yB − y
B.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose (5) and (6) hold. Under Selden-EZ preferences,






















be the Selden-EZ utilities as a function of π. From (5), (6), (13), and (14),



























































































B(π)|π=1 < 0, (19)
so that for some π ∈ (0,1) close to π =1 ,fA(π)|π≈1 >f B(π)|π≈1, i.e., gamble
A is strictly preferred to gamble B.
Suppose next that the ordinal preferences over the bundles are as depicted
in Figure 3. In contrast to Proposition 2.2, Proposition 2.4 states that the
ordering over the two gambles can be inconsistent with ordinal preferences.
That is, gamble A which is strictly worse (in terms of utility outcomes) than
gamble B can be chosen under the Selden-EZ approach. Moreover, the fact
that Selden-EZ preferences chooses gamble A is unrelated to the riskiness
of the utilities corresponding to the values of the risky good. In fact, from
Figure 3, even though u2(yA) − u2(y
A) >u 2(yB) − u2(y
B), gamble A is
preferred. It should also be noted that, for given π ∈ (0,1) for which gamble
A is strictly preferred to gamble B, increasing the concavity of vS eventually
leads to a reversal of the ordering of the gambles, i.e., for very concave vS,
gamble B is preferred to gamble A. Indeed, as vS becomes more concave,
the certainty equivalent tends toward the lowest utility, and, from (8), the
individual no longer neglects the issue of tastes and jumps back to gamble
B.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose (8) and (9) hold. Under Selden-EZ preferences,
gamble A can be preferred to gamble B.
Proof. From (8), (9), (13), and (14), fA(0) = fB(0) and fA(1) <f B(1).
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so that for some π ∈ (0,1) close to π =0 ,fA(π)|π≈0 >f B(π)|π≈0, i.e., gamble
A is strictly preferred to gamble B.
Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 show that the certainty equivalent in the multi-
dimensional case cannot be compared in a meaningful way when considering
gambles that are on diﬀerent vertical lines, i.e., gi ≡ (π ◦ (xi,y i),(1 − π) ◦
(x 
i,y 
i)), xi  = x 
i,y i  = y 
i).9 In fact, implicit in the comparison across diﬀer-
ent vertical lines are the tastes or preferences corresponding to the points on
these two diﬀerent vertical lines. Changing the concavity of vS in Selden-EZ
preferences thus conﬂate risk aversion and tastes.
As noted, the inconsistency regarding ordinal preferences occurs because











9Only gambles that have their same ﬁrst argument (i.e., gambles on the same vertical
line) can be compared, e.g., gi ≡ (π ◦ (x,yi),(1 − π) ◦ (x,y 
i)), yi  = y 
i using the certainty
equivalent approach. That is, it is only when restricting attention to gambles on a vertical
line that an increase in the concavity of vS (yielding a decrease in the certainty equivalent)
is related to risk aversion.
15the expected marginal rate of substitution is distorted by the Selden-EZ
approach. To see this, we now present the expected marginal rate of substi-
tution under both KM and Selden-EZ preferences. Consider the gamble
g ≡ (π ◦ (x,y + ε),(1 − π) ◦ (x,y − ε)) (26)
for π ∈ (0,1) and y>ε≥ 0.
Using (2), the KM utility function is
WKM(x, ˜ y)=πvKM(u1(x)+u2(y+ε))+(1−π)vKM(u1(x)+u2(y−ε)), (27)
where v 
KM > 0,v  




















Note that, for a given gamble, since the two values of ˜ y occur on separate
indiﬀerence curves, the expected marginal rate of substitution is a convex
combination of the marginal rates of substitution under certainty. Using (11),
the Selden-EZ utility function is rewritten as




S (πvS(y + ε)+( 1− π)vS(y − ε)) (31)












On the one hand, from (28), the KM approach aﬀects the weights on the
marginal utilities of the second argument, without aﬀecting the values on
16the marginal utilities themselves. On the other hand, On the other hand,
from (32), with the Selden-EZ approach, the marginal utility of the sec-
ond argument is evaluated at the certainty equivalent and is distorted by
the derivative of the certainty equivalent with respect to the outcome of y.
This distortion has the eﬀect of changing the ordering preferences over the
gambles.
3 The Eﬀect of Risk Aversion
In this section, we study the eﬀect of risk aversion on the optimal choice of
the consumption proﬁle (x, ˜ y) ∈ R2
+ with utility function U(x, ˜ y), U1,U 2 >
0,U 11,U 22 < 0. In the stochastic environment, x is the sure good, while ˜ y is
the risky good due to the presence of randomness in the budget constraint.
Using the KM utility representation, the consumer’s maximization problem
under uncertainty is
max
x WKM(x, ˜ y(x)) = max
x E˜ y(x)vKM (U(x, ˜ y(x))), (33)
where E˜ y(x) is the expectation operator over ˜ y(x), and vKM is a strictly
increasing and concave function, v 
KM > 0,v  
KM ≤ 0. Note that the risky
good depends on x through the budget constraint, i.e., y(x)=( I −Pxx)/Py,
where I is income, and Px and Py are the prices of goods x and y, respectively.
The eﬀect of risk aversion is studied in three diﬀerent cases: random income,
random price for the sure good, and random price for the risky good.10
10As noted, the Selden-EZ approach cannot be used to study the eﬀect of risk aversion
because it does not disentangle risk aversion and tastes. Speciﬁcally, by choosing the
optimal gamble (x, ˜ y(x)) on a particular vertical line, the consumer must compare gambles
on diﬀerent vertical lines, thereby conﬂating tastes and attitudes toward risk, in which case
Selden-EZ preferences does not measure the pure eﬀect of risk aversion on decisions.
173.1 Random Income












where E˜ I is the expectation operator for ˜ I. Proposition 3.1 states that the
eﬀect of risk aversion depends on the income eﬀect when only income is
random. The change in consumption due to a change in risk aversion does
not result from a change in income as in the usual income eﬀect. Instead
Proposition 3.1 deals with the distribution of utilities associated with random
income and the eﬀect of that distribution of utilities on the choice of the
consumption bundle as the consumer becomes more risk averse. In particular,
when the sure good is normal, a more risk-averse individual always consumes
more of the risky good.
Proposition 3.1. Given (34), a more risk-averse individual
1. decreases the amount of a normal good x,
2. increases the amount of an inferior good x,a n d
3. does not change the amount of good x if there is no income eﬀect.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This counter-intuitive result is explained by the fact that the individual
faces a utility gamble with each possible choice of the sure good x.T h e
riskiness of the utility gamble is implicit in the optimal trade-oﬀ between
the sure good and the risky good and is crucial to the choice of the individ-
ual, overshadowing the relevance of the riskiness of the good ˜ y.I n f a c t , a
more risk-averse individual chooses a level of consumption that reduces the
riskiness of the utility levels associated with random income. To see this,
we proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst establish a relationship between the in-
come eﬀect and the types of utility gambles an individual faces. We then
explain how optimal behavior is changed when risk-aversion increases. To
18that end, it is convenient to adopt a simple distribution for income, i.e.,
˜ I ∼

π ◦ I,(1 − π) ◦ I

, π ∈ [0,1].
Income Eﬀect and Utility Gambles. The income eﬀect is key in
explaining how changes in x aﬀect the riskiness of the utility gambles. To
see this, let xI and xI be the optimal consumption for the sure good when
π =1a n dπ = 0, respectively. For nondegenerate distributions of income,
x ∈ [min{xI,x I},max{xI,x I}] is the range of possible choices. We consider
two cases.












Py be the marginal utility of consumption under
income I ∈{ I,I}. Then, for any choice of x, the marginal utility under low
income at the corresponding point of the lower budget constraint is smaller
than the marginal utility under high income at the corresponding point of
the upper budget constraint. Moreover, when the marginal utility under low
income is tangent to the corresponding budget constraint, (i.e., x = xI),
then the marginal utility under high income is strictly positive. Hence, for











is positive and strictly increasing in x ∈ [xI,x I]. In other words, a decrease
in x brings the two utility levels closer together. In terms of gambles, this
means that a decrease in x results in a less risky utility gamble.
The relationship between x and the riskiness of the utility gamble is
clearly shown in Figure 4 when the sure good is normal, i.e., xI <x I.T h e
straight lines represent the budget constraints under low income and high
income, while the convex lines are indiﬀerence curves. Note that the bundles
(xI,y I(xI)) and (xI,y I(xI)) are the optimal bundles under certain low income
and certain high income, respectively.11 When income is random, choosing
















for x ∈ [xI,x I]. From Figure 4, the choice xI has a utility gamble corre-








Figure 4: Utility Gambles with Normal Good x
20sponding to the solid circles, while the choice xI has a utility gamble cor-
responding to the empty circles. Hence, the gamble g(xI)i sl e s sr i s k yt h a n
the gamble g(xI). In general, as shown in Figure 4 this implies that, for





























Suppose next that the good is inferior, i.e., xI >x I, so that the marginal
utility under high income is smaller than the marginal utility under low
income at the corresponding point on the budget constraint. Hence, for











is positive and strictly decreasing in x ∈ [xI,x I]. In other words, an increase
in x brings the two utility levels closer together. In terms of gambles, this
means that an increase in x results in a less risky utility gamble, as depicted
in Figure 5, where the utility gamble associated with x∗ is less risky than
the utility gamble corresponding to x. In general, this implies that, for





























Optimal Utility Gamble. Having shown that the income eﬀect deter-
mines the direction of a reduction in the riskiness of a gamble, we next turn
to the optimal behavior. Without loss of generality, we deﬁne two diﬀerent
KM utility representations, W 1
KM(x, ˜ y(x)) = U (x, ˜ y(x)) and W 2
KM(x, ˜ y(x)) =
ϕ(U (x, ˜ y(x))), ϕ  > 0,ϕ    < 0, so that W 2
KM is strictly more risk-averse than
W 1
KM.













Py is the marginal
utility of consumption for I ∈{ I,I}. Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions corre-
sponding to preferences W 1
KM and W 2
KM are
πMU(x,I)+( 1− π)MU(x,I)=0 , (38)
21Figure 5: Utility Gambles with Inferior Good x
22and
πρ(x,I,ϕ
 )MU(x,I)+( 1− π)ρ(x,I,ϕ




























is a weighting function that depends on the risk aversion of the individual,
ρ(x,I,ϕ  )=1− ρ(x,I,ϕ ) ∈ [0,1]. Note that risk-aversion measured by
the function ϕ enters the ﬁrst-order condition only through the weighting
function ρ. Remark 3.2 states the eﬀect of risk-aversion on the weighting
function.
Remark 3.2. When income is random, the more risk-averse individual adds
more weight to the low value of income, i.e., ρ(x,I,ϕ  ) > 1/2.
Given Remark 3.2, the eﬀect of risk aversion is determined by the income
eﬀect, which orders the marginal utilities.
Remark 3.3. When the good is normal, MU(x,I) <M U (x,I),w h i l e ,a n
inferior good yields MU(x,I) >MU(x,I).
Combining Remarks 3.2 and 3.3 implies that a more risk-averse individual
puts more weight on the lower marginal utility, which corresponds to the low
income when the good is normal and the high income when the good is
inferior. Hence, a more risk-averse agent decreases the amount of the sure
good if and only if it is normal.
It is worth noting that before imposing the more risk averse transforma-
tion ϕ, expected utility maximization yields a trade-oﬀ between the sure good
and the risky good. However, the introduction of ϕ changes that trade-oﬀ by
giving the more risk-averse individual an incentive to choose a less risky util-
ity gamble. In the random income case, this is done by reducing the amount
o ft h es u r eg o o dx. From this vantage point, it appears that the cardinality
of the utility function determines the consumer’s choice. However, it is clear










Figure 6: Optimal Utility Gamble with Normal Good x
dictates a decrease in the amount of the sure good x, which results in a less
risky utility gamble.
Figure 6 further illustrates the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal behav-
ior when preferences are Cobb-Douglas, i.e., U(x,y)=xαy1−α, α ∈ (0,1).12
Here, the sure good x is normal. The solid lines represent the utility func-
tions, while the dotted decreasing lines represent the marginal utility func-
tions. The points x1 and x2 are the optimal bundles corresponding to pref-
erences W 1
KM and W 2
KM, respectively. From Figure 6, an increase in risk-
aversion adds more weight to the marginal utility under low income, which
decreases the amount of the sure good, i.e., x1 >x 2, so as to reduce the
riskiness of the utility gamble, i.e., u1 <u 2 < u2 < u1.
12To generate the graph, we set Px = Py =1a n dI ∈{ 2,5}.
243.2 Random Prices
Having shown that the eﬀect of risk aversion depends on the income eﬀect
when income is random, we next study the cases of random prices. Here, the
relative strength of the income and substitution eﬀects determine the eﬀect
of risk aversion on the optimal choice of x.
Random Price of the Sure Good. When the price of the sure good












where E ˜ Px is the expectation operator for ˜ Px. Proposition 3.4 states that
the eﬀect of risk aversion is determined by the interplay of the income and
substitution eﬀects.
Proposition 3.4. Given (41), a more risk-averse individual
1. decreases the amount of a normal good x,a n d
2. increases the amount of an inferior good x if and only if the income
eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To explain the results in Proposition 3.4, it is convenient to adopt a simple
distribution for the price of the sure good, i.e., ˜ Px ∼

π ◦ Px,(1 − π) ◦ P x

,
π ∈ [0,1]. Without loss of generality, we deﬁne two diﬀerent KM utility repre-
sentations, W 1
KM(x, ˜ y(x)) = U (x, ˜ y(x)) and W 2
KM(x, ˜ y(x)) = ϕ(U (x, ˜ y(x))),
ϕ  > 0,ϕ    < 0, so that W 2
KM is strictly more risk-averse than W 1
KM.











Py be the marginal
utility of consumption for Px ∈{ Px,Px}, the ﬁrst-order conditions corre-
sponding to preferences W 1
KM and W 2
KM are
πMU(x,P x)+( 1− π)MU(x,P x)=0 , (42)
25and
πρ(x,P x,ϕ
 )MU(x,P x)+( 1− π)ρ(x,P x,ϕ



























is a weighting function that depends on the risk aversion of the individual,
ρ(x,P x,ϕ  )=1− ρ(x,P x,ϕ  ) ∈ [0,1]. Note that risk-aversion measured by
the function ϕ enters the ﬁrst-order condition only through the weighting
function ρ, as in the case of random income. Remark 3.5 states the eﬀect of
risk-aversion on the weighting function when Px is random.
Remark 3.5. When the price of the sure good is random, the more risk-
averse individual adds less weight to the low value of Px, i.e., ρ(x,P x,ϕ  ) <
1/2.
The eﬀect of risk aversion is determined by the income and substitution
eﬀects, which orders the marginal utilities. Abstracting for a moment that
we are dealing with only two values for Px, the sign of the derivative of




















where IEPx and SEPx < 0 are proportional to and of the same sign as the
income eﬀect and the substitution eﬀect, respectively, related to a change in
Px.
Remark 3.6. When the good is normal, both the income and substitution
eﬀects are negative, so that MU(x,P x) >M U (x,P x). When the good is
inferior, i.e., IEPx > 0, the relative strengths of the income and substitution
eﬀects determine the ordering of the marginal utilities. For instance, if the
26Figure 7: Utility Gambles with Normal Good x and Random Px
(positive) income eﬀect is stronger than the (negative) substitution eﬀect,
then, from (45), MU(x,P x) <MU(x,P x).
Remarks 3.5 and 3.6 explain the result in Proposition 3.4. In particular,
when the good is normal, a more risk-averse individual individual puts less
weight to the marginal utility corresponding to the high price of x.P r o p o -
sition 3.4 is illustrated in Figure 7 for the case of a normal good x.D u et o
the randomness of Px, the slope of the budget constraint makes the utility
gamble less risky as consumption decreases. Speciﬁcally, when Px is random,
the pure substitution eﬀect induces a squeeze in the utility gamble in the
direction of less quantity of the sure good, from x to x∗, which increases the
amount of the risky good y.
Random Price of the Risky Good. When the price of the risky good
27Figure 8: Utility Gambles with Normal Good x and Random Py












where E ˜ Py is the expectation operator for ˜ Py. Proposition 3.7 states that the
eﬀect of risk aversion is again determined by the interplay of the income and
substitution eﬀects.
Proposition 3.7. Given (46), a more risk-averse individual
1. decreases the amount of a normal good x if and only if the income eﬀect
is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, and
2. increases the amount of an inferior good x.
28Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.7 is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows that, when the
price of the risky good is random, the substitution eﬀect induces a squeeze
in the utility gamble by increasing the amount of the sure good from x to x∗.
3.3 Examples
Propositions 3.1, 3.4, and 3.7 establish the connection between risk aversion
and classical demand theory implicit in KM, and explain, in that context,
the limits of the intuition of the Ross (1981) critique on risk aversion. In
particular, increasing the amount of the risky good when risk aversion in-
creases, is natural and not counterintuitive, as thought by Ross (1981) and
his followers. We now illustrate our results by considering speciﬁc classes of
preferences: Cobb-Douglas, Leontief, and quasi-linear utility functions.
Suppose that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, i.e., U(x,y)=xαyβ,α,β>
0, so that x is a normal good. Note that the results in Propositions 3.1, 3.4,
and 3.7 continue to hold, even when the utility function is concave or convex,
as long as there is an interior solution to the constrained optimization prob-
lem. For random income, more risk aversion has the eﬀect of decreasing the
amount of x. This result is even stronger when the price of x is random, since
the income and the substitution eﬀects go in the same direction. However,
when the price of y is random, the income and the substitution eﬀects not
only go in opposite directions, but cancel each other out with Cobb-Douglas
preferences. This is exactly the consumption-saving problem discussed in
KM, in which the rate of return (the price of y) is random.
Suppose next that preferences are Leontief, i.e., U(x,y)=u(min{x,y}),
u  > 0,u    < 0, so that x is a normal good. Then, there is no substitution
eﬀect and the income eﬀect determines the direction of the change along
with an increase in risk aversion. In particular, regardless of the source of
risk, an increase in risk aversion always decreases the amount of the sure
good in favor of the risky good. To see this, consider the income distribution








x, ˜ I − x

. (47)
The optimal solution lies in
I
2 ≤ x ≤ I





x,  I − x

= πu(x)+( 1− π)u(I − x), so that the
ﬁrst-order condition is
πu
 (x) − (1 − π)u
 (I − x)=0 = ⇒
u (x)









πϕ(u(x)) + (1 − π)ϕ(u(I − x)), (49)





∗) − (1 − π)ϕ
 (u(I − x
∗))u








ϕ (u(I − x∗))
ϕ (u(x∗))
(51)
since ϕ is strictly concave and
I
2 ≤ x ≤
I
2. Then,

















 (x) ⇒ x
∗ <x ,
as shown in Figure 9.
13Note that if x<
I




2, then the outcome is strictly worse than choosing x =
¯ I
2. Note also that in this
case, the optimal solution has both x and y positive, i.e., there is no corner solution, in
which either x =0o ry = 0. However, on the interval
I
2 ≤ x ≤
¯ I
2, there can be “corner
solutions”, when x =
I
2 or x = I
2, which correspond to the most risk-averse and the most
risk-loving choices respectively.
30Figure 9: Leontief Preferences
31In other words, the more risk-averse individual consumes even more of
the risky good due to the presence of only income eﬀects.14 This decrease in
the amount of the sure good x yields a less risky utility gamble as depicted
in Figure 9. Note that, with Leontief preferences, the amount of x always
decreases because there is only a pure income eﬀect, i.e., without substitution.
That is why Leontief preferences yield results opposite to the Arrow-Pratt’s
portfolio problem, in which there is no income eﬀect and only substitution
eﬀect.
Suppose ﬁnally that preferences are quasi-linear, where x is a normal
good. These preferences shed light on the Arrow-Pratt result, i.e., an increase
in risk aversion increases the amount of income invested in the safe asset (i.e.,
allocated to the sure good in our context). We now demonstrate that Arrow-
Pratt’s result holds due to the absence of the income eﬀect, and that the
source of uncertainty lies in the rate of return of the risky asset. Speciﬁcally,
we consider two cases and show stark diﬀerence in results between the two.
First, consider the case in which there is no income eﬀect for the sure good
x, i.e., U(x,y)=u1(x)+y,u 
1 > 0,u   
1 < 0. Hence, when income is random,
since there is no income eﬀect, risk aversion has no eﬀect on the amount of x.
When the price of x is random, increased risk aversion cause the amount of x
to decrease solely due to the substitution eﬀect. However, for random price
of the risky good, the substitution eﬀect dominates (since there is no income
eﬀect), which implies that the amount of x increases along with an increase in
risk aversion. This result generalizes the result in the Arrow-Pratt portfolio
problem. In fact, it is only in this case that increasing risk aversion increases
the amount of the sure good without reference to income and substitution
eﬀects. However, the result is not robust to a slight modiﬁcation in the
utility function. To see this, consider the quasi-linear utility function, i.e.,
U(x,y)=x + u2(y),u  
2 > 0,u   
2 < 0. In this case, the good x is normal,
so that if either income or the price of x is random, risk aversion decreases
the amount of the sure good x. On the other hand, for random price of the
14Note that if the initial choice is x =
I
2, then the consumer is making the most risk-
averse choice. Therefore a more risk-averse transformation cannot reduce the level of
x.
32risky good, the income and substitution eﬀects pull in opposite directions.
If the income eﬀect is dominant, then an increase in risk aversion leads to a
decrease in the amount of the sure good x. This last result illustrates that
the Arrow-Pratt result is solely due to the absence of an income eﬀect on
x. Finally, note that another version of the Arrow-Pratt theorem is that, if
income increases, then an individual with decreasing risk aversion reduces
the amount of the sure good. This result is not general and is due only to
the fact that, in the portfolio problem, there is no income eﬀect for the sure
good.
4F i n a l R e m a r k s
In this paper, we completely characterize the relationship between changes
in risk aversion and classical demand theory in the case of a single source of
uncertainty. We show that a more risk averse consumer generally decreases
the amount placed in the sure good. In addition, we show that it is the util-
ity gambles that determine the choice of a more risk-averse agent between
the sure good and the risky good. This provides an explanation for certain
paradoxical behaviors of an individual who becomes more risk-averse. The
paper also paves a path for some immediate interesting questions. In partic-
ular, one could ask what the relationship between risk aversion and classical
demand theory implies for changes in income in which the consumer is de-
creasingly risk-averse. This is especially interesting in light of Arrow-Pratt’s
result that in the portfolio case increasing income results in an increase in
the risky assert if and only if the consumer is decreasingly risk averse with
income.
33AP r o o f s
We recall Theorem 236 in Hardy et al. (1964), which we appeal in the proofs
of the propositions.
Lemma A.1. If λ 
1(t),λ  
2(t) > 0 or λ 
1(t),λ  
2(t) < 0,t h e nE˜ tλ1(˜ t)λ2(˜ t) >
E˜ tλ1(˜ t) · E˜ tλ2(˜ t).I f λ 
1(t) > 0,λ  
2(t) < 0 or λ 
1(t) < 0,λ  
2(t) > 0,t h e n
E˜ tλ1(˜ t)λ2(˜ t) < E˜ tλ1(˜ t) · E˜ tλ2(˜ t).
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Without loss of generality, consider two dif-
ferent KM utility representations, W 1
KM(x, ˜ y(x)) = E˜ IU

x,(˜ I − Pxx)/Py

and W 2




x,(˜ I − Pxx)/Py

, ϕ  > 0,ϕ    < 0. Here, W 2
KM
is strictly more risk-averse than W 1
KM.

























































Let x1 and x2 be the optimal choice of the sure good satisfying (52) and (53),
respectively.
Given the deﬁnition of f(x,I,Px,P y) in (53), ϕ   < 0,U 2 > 0i m p l yt h a t
∂f/∂I < 0. We now consider three cases.
1. Suppose ﬁrst that x is a normal good. Then, given the deﬁnition of













34where IEI is proportional and of the same sign as the income eﬀect
related to a change in income.
Since ∂f/∂I < 0,∂h/∂I >0, Lemma A.1 and (52) imply that
E˜ If(x, ˜ I,Px,P y)h(x, ˜ I,Px,P y) < E˜ If(x, ˜ I,Px,P y)·E˜ Ih(x, ˜ I,Px,P y)=0 .
(55)
Since x1,x 2 are unique interior solutions, x1 >x 2, i.e., a more risk-
averse individual decreases the consumption of a normal sure good.
2. Suppose next that x is an inferior good. Then, from (54), ∂h/∂I < 0.
Since ∂f/∂I < 0,∂h/∂I <0, Lemma A.1 and (52) imply that
E˜ If(x, ˜ I,Px,P y)h(x, ˜ I,Px,P y) > E˜ If(x, ˜ I,Px,P y)·E˜ Ih(x, ˜ I,Px,P y)=0 .
(56)
Since x1,x 2 are unique interior solutions, x1 <x 2, i.e., a more risk-
averse individual increases the consumption of an inferior sure good.
3. Suppose ﬁnally that there is no income eﬀect. Then, x1 = x2.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Without loss of generality, consider two dif-
ferent KM utility representations, W 1
KM(x, ˜ y(x)) = E ˜ PxU

x,(I − ˜ Pxx)/Py

and W 2




x,(I − ˜ Pxx)/Py

, ϕ  > 0,ϕ    < 0. Here,
W 2
KM is strictly more risk-averse than W 1
KM.

























































35Let x1 and x2 be the optimal choice of the sure good satisfying (57) and (58),
respectively.
Given the deﬁnition of f(x,I,Px,P y) in (53), ϕ   < 0,U 2 > 0i m p l yt h a t
∂f/∂Px > 0. We now consider two cases.
1. Suppose ﬁrst that x is a normal good. Then, given the deﬁnition of






















as both the income and the substitution eﬀects pull in the same direc-
tion, IEPx < 0,SE Px < 0. Here, IEPx and SEPx are proportional and
of the same sign as the income and substitution eﬀects, respectively,
related to a change in Px.
Since ∂f/∂Px > 0,∂h/∂P x < 0, Lemma A.1 and (57) imply that
E ˜ Pxf(x,I, ˜ Px,P y)h(x,I,Px,P y) < E ˜ Pxf(x,I, ˜ Px,P y)·E ˜ Pxh(x,I,Px,P y)=0 .
(60)
Since x1,x 2 are unique interior solutions, x1 >x 2, i.e., a more risk-
averse individual decreases the consumption of a normal sure good.
2. Suppose next that x is an inferior good, i.e., IEPx > 0. Then, from (59),
if the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, ∂h/∂Px > 0.
Since ∂f/∂Px,∂h/∂P x > 0, Lemma A.1 and (52) imply that
E ˜ Pxf(x,I, ˜ Px,P y)h(x,I, ˜ Px,P y) > E ˜ Pxf(x,I, ˜ Px,P y)·E ˜ Pxh(x,I, ˜ Px,P y)=0 .
(61)
Since x1,x 2 are unique interior solutions, x1 <x 2, i.e., a more risk-
averse individual increases the consumption of an inferior sure good. If
the income eﬀect is weaker than the substitution eﬀect, then, by the
same argument, x1 >x 2. Finally, if the income and substitution eﬀects
cancel each other, then x1 = x2.
36Proof of Proposition 3.7. Without loss of generality, consider two dif-
ferent KM utility representations, W 1
KM(x, ˜ y(x)) = E ˜ P˜ yU

x,(I − Pxx)/ ˜ P˜ y

and W 2




x,(I − Pxx)/ ˜ P˜ y

, ϕ  > 0,ϕ    < 0. Here,
W 2
KM is strictly more risk-averse than W 1
KM.





















≡h(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)
=0 , (62)































≡h(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)
=0 .
(63)
Let x1 and x2 be the optimal choice of the sure good satisfying (62) and (63),
respectively.
Given the deﬁnition of f(x,I,Px,P y) in (53), ϕ   < 0,U 2 > 0i m p l yt h a t
∂f/∂Py > 0. We now consider two cases.
1. Suppose ﬁrst that x is an inferior good. Then, given the deﬁnition of
























as both the income and the substitution eﬀects pull in the same direc-
tion, IEPy > 0,SE Py > 0. Here, IEPy and SEPy are proportional and
of the same sign as the income and substitution eﬀects, respectively,
related to a change in the price of ˜ y.
37Since ∂f/∂Px,∂h/∂P x > 0, Lemma A.1 and (52) imply that
E ˜ P˜ yf(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)h(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y) > E ˜ P˜ yf(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)·E ˜ P˜ yh(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)=0 .
(65)
Since x1,x 2 are unique interior solutions, x1 <x 2, i.e., a more risk-
averse individual increases the consumption of an inferior sure good.
2. Suppose next that x is a normal good, i.e., IEPy < 0. Then, from (64),
if the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, then ∂h/∂Py <
0. Since ∂f/∂Py > 0,∂h/∂P y < 0, Lemma A.1 and (62) imply that
E ˜ P˜ yf(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)h(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y) < E ˜ P˜ yf(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)·E ˜ P˜ yh(x,I,Px, ˜ P˜ y)=0 .
(66)
Since x1,x 2 are unique interior solutions, x1 >x 2, i.e., a more risk-
averse individual decreases the consumption of a normal sure good. If
the substitution eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, then, by
the same argument, x1 >x 2. Finally, if the income and substitution
eﬀects cancel each other, then x1 = x2.
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